The Looming Demotion: Here’s Why These 8 ASX Stocks Are Being Removed from the ASX All Ords!

In a couple of weeks, some ASX Stocks Are Being Removed from the ASX All Ords. Other companies will take their place and it was only yesterday that we wrote about that fact and some of the companies being promoted. But today it is time to look at the stocks suffering the indignity of being demoted.

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Here’s Why These 8 ASX Stocks Are Being Removed from the ASX All Ords!

Air New Zealand (ASX: AIZ)

Air New Zealand’s removal from the All Ordinaries is the culmination of an 18-month earnings deterioration driven by a compounding series of structural and operational headwinds. The root cause is the global Pratt & Whitney GTF engine crisis: between 9 and 11 of the airline’s aircraft remained grounded throughout FY26 due to mandatory inspection and repair requirements for powder metal contamination in engine turbine discs, forcing the airline to lease expensive replacement aircraft and reducing available seat kilometres by 4% in FY25.

Air New Zealand’s removal from the All Ordinaries is the culmination of an 18-month earnings deterioration driven by a compounding series of structural and operational headwinds. The root cause is the global Pratt & Whitney GTF engine crisis: between 9 and 11 of the airline’s aircraft remained grounded throughout FY26 due to mandatory inspection and repair requirements for powder metal contamination in engine turbine discs, forcing the airline to lease expensive replacement aircraft and reducing available seat kilometres by 4% in FY25.

The airline reported full-year FY25 pre-tax earnings of NZ$189m which was down 16% from FY24 and declared a dividend with an unsustainable 95.93% payout ratio — well outside its typical 40–70% policy range. Guidance for H1 FY26 was initially for a modest profit, but a sharp revenue miss — driven by a 2–3% domestic and US-bound booking shortfall worth approximately NZ$50m — combined with NZ$20m in additional engine lease costs and NZ$10m in new CORSIA carbon compliance obligations turned that into a first-half pre-tax loss of NZ$59m.

Then in March 2026, the airline suspended its full-year FY26 earnings guidance entirely, citing jet fuel prices surging from US$85 per barrel to US$150–200 per barrel following escalating Middle East conflict. With 83% of fuel hedged against crude but minimal protection from widening crack spreads, the earnings outlook became impossible to quantify. The share price fell almost 14% year-to-date by February 2026, dragging the market capitalisation below the minimum threshold for All Ordinaries inclusion.

Austin Engineering (ASX: ANG)

Long a favourite of ASX small cap fundies, Austin Engineering’s exit from the All Ordinaries follows a dramatic and swift deterioration in profitability that shocked the market in early 2026. The company, which manufactures replacement truck trays, mining buckets and water tanks across Australia, North America and South America, reported H1 FY26 net profit after tax of just A$2.0m — a stunning 85% collapse from A$13.4m in the prior corresponding period — despite only a 3% decline in revenue to A$170.3m.

The primary cause was a deeply unprofitable OEM manufacturing contract in Chile, which generated a negative EBITDA contribution of A$3.2m for the half, including A$1.6m in onerous contract provisions against unfinished inventory. The Chilean operation suffered cascading failures: poorly priced OEM commitments, inadequate steel yard controls, workforce inefficiencies, and an inability to hit production throughput targets. Group EBITDA fell 63% to A$8.0m.

The damage was compounded by order deferrals in Indonesia related to disruptions at a local mine site and continued growing pains in the US business driving higher overheads. A profit warning in November 2025 had already flagged the Chile issues, but the February 2026 H1 results confirmed they were worse than anticipated — the share price fell 28.3% on the day of release to A$0.265. Austin engaged new Chilean management, cut headcount to 1,222 globally, and entered renegotiations over the OEM contract, threatening to walk away by April 2026 if pricing and terms could not be improved. Full-year EBITDA guidance was cut to A$14–16m. The share price de-rating drove the market cap below All Ordinaries thresholds.

Coast Entertainment Holdings (ASX: CEH)

Coast Entertainment Holdings, the operator of Dreamworld, WhiteWater World and SkyPoint on Queensland’s Gold Coast, is one of the few removals whose operational fundamentals are actually improving. For the half-year ended December 2025, the company delivered operating revenue of A$62.2m up 30.2% year-on-year. Visitation to its theme parks and attractions surged 44%, ticket sales rose 47%, and EBITDA (excluding specific items) increased an extraordinary 368% to A$8.7m.

The results reflected the success of targeted capital investment — the mid-December 2025 launch of the King Claw thrill ride drove significant new and repeat visitation, while a strategic partnership with Australian Geographic reimagined the wildlife precinct. The company also signed a partnership with Network Ten to host Big Brother at Dreamworld, generating national media exposure, incremental catering and merchandise revenue, and making it the network’s biggest reality show since 2023. Annual pass revenue grew strongly, with deferred balances up 43% to A$21.8m.

Despite all this, CEH’s removal reflects nothing more than market cap mechanics. The stock had been trading at approximately A$0.43–0.50 per share across much of 2025, leaving the market cap around A$165–200m — below the threshold S&P Dow Jones Indices requires to maintain All Ordinaries membership. The company’s five-year total shareholder return and 52-week performance were both positive, but the stock’s absolute size simply no longer qualifies for All Ords inclusion.

Findi (ASX: FND)

Findi’s removal from the All Ordinaries is one of the more striking cases in this rebalance, given the company’s genuine underlying business quality. The ASX-listed Indian payments and ATM company — operator of one of India’s largest non-bank ATM networks — posted record FY25 revenue of A$75.5m (up 13.6%), EBITDA of A$31.4m (up 14.4%), and underlying net profit before tax of A$6.0m (up 54.5%).

The investment case appeared compelling: landmark multi-year ATM contracts with State Bank of India and Central Bank of India, acquisition of Tata Communications Payment Solutions (TCPSL) and BankIT to cement its position as India’s only pan-Indian operator with a nationwide digital business, and a planned Bombay Stock Exchange IPO of its subsidiary TSI India in 2026 that was targeting a A$1 billion+ valuation.

However, H1 FY26 revealed the true cost of integrating two major acquisitions simultaneously. Non-recurring items of A$7.7m — including ATM rollout funding delays, additional direct cost provisions, one-off termination payments and legal costs — gutted near-term earnings. The enterprise value swelled as the acquisitions loaded the balance sheet with debt; by February 2026 PitchBook reported enterprise value of A$175.7m against a market cap of only A$50.7m.

The stock collapsed from a 52-week high of A$6.18 to around A$0.83, an >85% fall from the peak. Investors had priced in rapid execution but the reality was messier post-acquisition integration. The reduced market cap triggered its All Ords removal, even as management guided for an annualised revenue run-rate of A$130–140m by March 2026.

Michael Hill (ASX: MHJ)

Michael Hill’s removal from the All Ordinaries is the product of several years of accumulated earnings pressure, compounded by the sudden death of its chief executive officer in February 2025. CEO Daniel Bracken — who had been leading a transformation program — passed away unexpectedly, leaving the group without permanent leadership for months.

Against that backdrop, FY25 delivered comparable EBIT of only A$24.1m earnings were compressed by aggressive retail competition and higher operating costs, and the Board declined to declare a final dividend for the year. Fourteen loss-making stores were permanently closed across the network. The Bevilles brand, which Michael Hill had acquired to diversify its Australian offering, suffered a non-cash impairment of A$7.4m amid challenging conditions. The primary drag was New Zealand, where a deep consumer recession drove a 7.8% same-store sales decline that more than offset record Canadian sales and flat Australian performance in the first half of FY25.

The group’s net cash turned to net debt during the period and shares de-rated sharply across 2024 and into 2025. The removal is based on the market cap sitting below the required threshold at the time of S&P’s March 2026 rebalance review. There are green shoots — new CEO Jonathan Waecker (appointed August 2025) delivered H1 FY26 comparable EBIT of A$31m up 28.6%, with same-store sales growing in all three markets — but the market had not yet fully re-rated the stock, and its market cap remained below the All Ords threshold when the measurement was taken.

OFX Group (ASX: OFX)

OFX’s removal from the All Ordinaries is the consequence of a multi-year earnings decline that began accelerating in 2024, driven by the competitive intensity of the global payments market and the disruption costs of the company’s platform overhaul. In October 2024, OFX issued a surprise profit warning for H1 FY25, causing the share price to fall 36% in a single session from A$2.28 to A$1.47. Full-year FY25 revenue came in at A$233.5m — down 3.8% on FY24 — and earnings fell 20.6%, the result of lower corporate revenue as the company worked through the migration of clients to its New Client Platform (NCP) and subdued consumer confidence suppressed transaction volumes, particularly in Australia.

Simultaneously, the fund-by-card functionality was taken offline for months during a provider transition, removing an important revenue-generating feature at the worst possible time. OFX is attempting a meaningful strategic pivot from a pure FX transfer platform to a broader financial operations suite — OFX 2.0 — offering multi-currency accounts, Visa corporate cards, spend management and accounting integrations. The NCP is now live across all major markets, with approximately 39% of existing corporate clients migrated by September 2025.

But the transformation has been costly and slow, and in the meantime fintech rivals including Wise, Airwallex, and Revolut have continued to gain market share. By February 2026, the stock had fallen to approximately A$0.37, representing a market cap of around A$85m — deep below Any All Ordinaries threshold. The company reaffirmed its long-term guidance of 15%+ annual NOI growth from FY28 onwards, but the market is not yet paying for that promise.

Shaver Shop (ASX: SSG)

Like Coast Entertainment, Shaver Shop’s removal from the All Ordinaries is a case of market cap mechanics rather than fundamental business failure. Now it is true that the glory days of 2020 are gone when people turned to this company for DIY haircuts given in-person hairdressers were forced to close. But the company has actually been executing its transformation strategy well.

For H1 FY26, Shaver Shop reported total sales of A$128.6m up 2.2% year-on-year — the second-highest first-half result in the company’s history — and achieved a record gross profit margin of 46.5%, a 100-basis-point improvement driven by the accelerated roll-out of its Transform-U private label brand in personal care categories. Net profit after tax rose 1.5% to A$12.2m. Online sales grew 7.6% to represent 24.6% of total revenue. The company remains debt-free with A$25.1m in net cash and A$30m in undrawn facilities.

However, the journey to this point involved considerable earnings volatility. FY25 comparable store sales across Australia and New Zealand stalled as consumers pulled back on discretionary spending amid cost-of-living pressure and high interest rates. Online sales declined 5% in H1 FY25. The share price drifted from above A$2.00 in 2021–2022 to around A$1.40–1.62 by late 2025, leaving the market cap at approximately A$185–200m — straddling or just below the All Ordinaries inclusion threshold.

While the business is profitable, dividend-paying, and showing signs of structural margin improvement through private-label mix enrichment, its absolute size has made it harder to maintain All Ords membership as higher-growth companies across the market take share of available float.

Renascor Resources (ASX: RNU)

Renascor Resources holds one of the world’s most significant graphite projects — the Siviour deposit on South Australia’s Eyre Peninsula, which is the world’s second-largest proven graphite reserve and the largest outside Africa. It is one of the few All Ords stocks with any exposure to graphite…well, in a couple of weeks time it’ll be more correct to say ‘it was one of the few ASX All Ords stocks…’.

The company has a compelling strategic proposition: vertically-integrated production of purified spherical graphite for lithium-ion battery anodes, with a 40-year mine life, world-class operating costs, and a A$185m conditional loan facility from Export Finance Australia under the federal government’s Critical Minerals Facility. It has received South Australian government approval for its Program for Environment Protection and Rehabilitation, and secured a site for its processing facility in Bolivar.

Yet the project has not reached a Final Investment Decision — and the reason is almost entirely the graphite market. From late 2022 through 2025, global graphite prices collapsed by more than 60%, driven by a massive oversupply of Chinese synthetic graphite and the proliferation of low-cost Chinese natural graphite flooding international markets. Chinese net imports fell while domestic synthetic production surged, destroying the margin assumptions underpinning most ex-China graphite projects.

Renascor’s share price fell from a high of A$0.38 in February 2022 to around A$0.06–0.08 through 2025 and into 2026, representing a market cap of approximately A$150–200m. The company cannot responsibly sanction construction without commercially binding offtake agreements and a supportive graphite price environment, and the FID — originally targeted for 2022–2023 — has been deferred for multiple consecutive years.

Without a production timeline, market confidence in near-term value delivery remains limited, and the reduced market cap triggered the sentence of All Ords removal.