5 Of The Most Gruesome ASX Takeover Battles Between Private Equity Firms!

The bidding contest for oOh!media (ASX: OML) is shaping up to be another one of the several hotly contested ASX takeover battles. Just a couple of weeks after Pacific Equity Partners (PEP) launched an unsolicited A$747m bid (at $1.40 per share), I Squared Capital (ISQ) countered at A$770.6m (or $1.45 per share). The oOh!media board rejected both as inadequate, signalling that shareholders believe intrinsic value sits above either number. Whether a higher bid emerges is uncertain, although we think its a question of when and not if. In any event, the contest itself is instructive.

What follows in this article is a review of six of the most contested such battles in recent Australian corporate history. Each illustrates a different dimension of private equity competition for ASX companies: the role of superannuation capital, the discipline of purchase price, and the structural themes that made these businesses worth fighting for.

6 Of the Most Fiercly Contested ASX Takeover Battles!

1. Healthscope

The Healthscope takeover contest remains the defining example of competitive private equity dealmaking in Australia, not only because of its scale but because of what followed after completion.
Background

Healthscope had already been through private equity hands. In 2010, a consortium led by TPG Capital and The Carlyle Group acquired the company for approximately A$2.7bn and delisted it. Under private ownership, Healthscope undertook 21 brownfield hospital projects, restructured its Asian pathology operations and returned to the ASX in July 2014 at a valuation of approximately A$3.6bn. By 2018, it was Australia’s second‑largest private hospital operator with a significant freehold property portfolio, making valuation more complex than a simple earnings multiple.

But we’re focusing on the 2018 contest which began in April of that year when BGH Capital, backed by AustralianSuper, offered A$2.36 per share. Brookfield Asset Management responded at A$2.50. The board initially refused due diligence access, arguing the bids undervalued both the property portfolio and the expected improvement in operating performance. Morningstar’s fair value estimate of A$2.40 sat between the two opening offers.

After a 13‑month stalemate, Brookfield prevailed. In early 2019, Healthscope recommended Brookfield’s A$2.50 per share scheme, valuing the group at A$4.5bn on an equity basis and approximately A$5.7bn including property. BGH indicated a willingness to improve its offer but was not granted equivalent due diligence access. AustralianSuper, despite backing BGH, did not participate in the outcome.

Brookfield levered the business heavily, sold hospital properties under sale‑and‑leaseback arrangements only to face structural pressures it had underestimated: declining occupancy, insurer margin compression, nursing shortages and the COVID‑19 disruption to elective surgery. Healthscope entered financial difficulty within a few years and would go under in the end. The ageing population thesis was sound; the price paid was not.

2. Virtus Health

The 2022 Virtus Health contest is a textbook example of competitive private equity bidding, with two well‑capitalised suitors escalating across several months. Virtus Health is one of the world’s top five assisted reproductive technology providers, with leading positions in Australia, Ireland and Denmark. IVF treatment generates recurring patient engagement, is relatively insulated from economic cycles and benefits from delayed childbearing trends. These characteristics made Virtus an obvious target for healthcare‑focused private equity.

BGH Capital quietly built a 19.99% stake through direct holdings and a total return swap, then launched an indicative A$7.10 offer. CapVest Partners entered with A$7.60, triggering a process that drew repeated scrutiny from the Takeovers Panel. The Panel required amendments to exclusivity arrangements to ensure the board could engage with both bidders.

CapVest raised to A$7.80 and then A$8.25. BGH countered with an A$8.00 off‑market takeover bid, which also locked in its blocking stake. The Virtus board recommended CapVest’s A$8.25 scheme, valuing the business at A$706m and representing a 58% premium to the pre‑announcement price.

However, CapVest’s scheme failed to achieve the required 75% support. BGH then proceeded to compulsory acquisition via its takeover bid. The outcome was unusual: CapVest offered the higher headline price, yet BGH ultimately acquired the company. CapVest’s willingness to pay more, combined with its healthcare track record, secured the board recommendation, although BGH’s blocking stake shaped the final execution.

3. Pacific Energy

Pacific Energy’s 2019 contest was smaller in absolute terms but illustrates how private equity and infrastructure capital compete for contracted‑revenue businesses in the resources‑adjacent energy sector.

Pacific Energy provides contracted power generation to remote mining operations. Long‑term take‑or‑pay agreements underpin predictable cash flows, making the business attractive to infrastructure investors. With a market capitalisation below A$500m, it sat squarely in the category of high‑quality niche assets that attract institutional interest despite limited liquidity.

In mid‑2019, Pacific Energy agreed to a A$0.975 per share scheme with QIC Private Capital. The offer was unanimously recommended. In September, Infrastructure Capital Group (ICG) and OPTrust submitted a competing A$1.085 proposal, an 11.3% premium to QIC’s price. QIC held matching rights but declined to exercise them. ICG and OPTrust completed the acquisition at approximately A$467m.

The margin of victory was narrow in absolute terms but meaningful for shareholders. For QIC, the lesson was clear: matching rights do not guarantee success when a rival bidder is prepared to pay materially more.

Pacific Energy’s subsequent sale to PEP in 2020 at a higher enterprise value underscores the enduring appeal of contracted power generation.

4. Spotless Group

The 2011–2012 Spotless saga remains one of the longest private equity battles in ASX history. Spotless was a major provider of integrated facilities services across Australia and New Zealand, with long‑term contracts across government, healthcare, education and corporate clients. Predictable revenue and defensible margins made it a natural private equity target.

Blackstone approached Spotless in May 2011 with A$2.50 per share. The board rejected the offer. Blackstone’s advisers introduced Pacific Equity Partners (PEP) as an alternative buyer. PEP offered A$2.63 in November, supported by several major shareholders. Those shareholders later indicated they would not sell below A$2.68, prompting PEP to raise its bid.

The final agreed price was A$2.71 per share, valuing the company at approximately A$720m. PEP completed the acquisition in 2012, restructured the business and relisted it in 2014 at roughly A$1.2bn. The relisted company later faced margin pressure and was acquired by Downer Group in 2017.

The Spotless contest demonstrated the influence of an informed institutional shareholder base. The final price reflected their understanding of the company’s contract‑backed earnings quality.

5. Veda Group

The Veda acquisition differs from the other contests but belongs in this analysis because private equity created the listed company and because Equifax’s approach triggered a competitive dynamic even without a formal rival bidder.

Veda was Australia’s leading consumer and commercial credit bureau. Pacific Equity Partners and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity floated the company in 2013 at A$1.25 per share. Veda’s recurring subscription revenues, proprietary datasets and regulatory tailwinds created a structural moat.

Equifax approached in September 2015 with A$2.70 per share, a 35% premium. The board declined to recommend the offer and pushed for an improved price. Equifax raised to A$2.825, adding roughly US$75m to the consideration. The board unanimously recommended the revised scheme, which completed in June 2016.

Equifax benefited from a weaker Australian dollar and from Veda’s irreplaceable dataset. For PEP and Merrill Lynch, the outcome validated both the asset quality and the timing of the IPO‑to‑exit pathway. The Veda story shows that a premium outcome does not always require two bidders; a motivated buyer and a disciplined board can achieve a similar result.

6. Link Group

The Link Administration Holdings saga is one of the most complex bidding sequences in recent ASX history. Link provided share registry and superannuation administration services. It listed in 2015 at A$6.37 per share and held a 44.2% stake in PEXA, which became the central asset in the takeover calculus. By 2020, Link’s core businesses were under pressure, but the PEXA stake was clearly undervalued by the market.

In October 2020, PEP and Carlyle offered A$5.20 per share. Perpetual supported the offer; Yarra Capital argued it undervalued the business. The board agreed with Yarra and declined to recommend. SS&C Technologies later entered with a competing proposal, although FIRB concerns over superannuation data sovereignty halted its progress.

Carlyle returned in November 2021 with A$5.38 per share, shortly after PEXA’s separate listing. Multiple revised bids followed before the consortium withdrew in April 2022. Interest in the PEXA stake at higher implied valuations made the consortium’s offer less compelling.

The final chapter came in late 2023 when Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation acquired Link for A$2.10 per share. For shareholders who held from the initial 2020 bid, the outcome was materially below the A$5.20 opening offer, largely due to PEXA’s share price decline. The Link saga shows how a demerger can fundamentally alter takeover dynamics and how regulatory sensitivity around superannuation data can derail even well‑priced bids.

Why ASX Takeover Battles Happen

Two structural forces make Australia fertile ground for these situations. The first is the superannuation pool. Australia’s compulsory retirement savings system now exceeds A$3.5 trillion, and the large industry funds, including AustralianSuper, Aware Super and Cbus, have expanded from passive equity holdings into co‑investment and direct acquisition strategies.

When paired with global private equity firms, these funds provide the equity depth required for transactions that would have been implausible a decade ago. The second force is the quality of the underlying businesses that find themselves in buyout crosshairs. Australian listed companies with recurring revenues, contracted cash flows and exposure to structural growth themes such as ageing demographics, expanding government services or essential infrastructure consistently attract multiple suitors willing to bid against each other. Deep domestic capital and genuinely attractive assets create the conditions for a bidding war.

Across these six contests, there is a consistent pattern. Private equity targets Australian listed companies with contracted or recurring revenues, where the market has undervalued either the cash flow quality or an embedded asset. Superannuation co‑investment has become a defining feature of the landscape, providing domestic credibility and capital depth. Outcomes are typically determined by either a board willing to hold out for a higher price or a blocking stake that complicates the preferred structure.

The current oOh!media contest shares several of these characteristics. Out‑of‑home advertising offers contracted but durable revenues, a physical network that cannot be replicated and a digital transition still underway. Whether A$1.40 or A$1.45 proves to be the floor rather than the ceiling remains open. History suggests the first bid rarely ends up being the last.