Private equity listings on the ASX that came and went: Here are 9 of the most recent!

Private equity listings on the ASX happen whenever a private equity firm wants to offload their investment (or leave the door open to it) and think this is more likely to be achieved by selling to retail investors rather than private equity. Overall there are more failures than successes and some of the companies still standing prove this including Myer (ASX:MYR) and Adore Beauty (ASX:ABY).

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9 private equity listings on the ASX that came and went

1. Link Administration (ASX:LNK)

Link was a financial administration and registry business: share registries, superannuation admin, corporate actions, data services. Pacific Equity Partners floated it in 2015 after a roll-up phase, selling the story of scale, sticky clients and steady cashflows. At listing, Link was already a mature, highly optimised business with limited organic growth but strong margins.

Once public, growth slowed, integration issues emerged, and the business faced fee pressure and contract losses. The market gradually derated it. Although Link paid dividends, the share price spent most of its life below the IPO price.

When it was taken private again in 2024, long-term retail holders who bought at IPO and held the whole way through likely made a small loss or, at best, a very low single-digit total return after dividends — well behind the market.

2. MYOB

MYOB is a provider accounting software for SMEs, floated by Bain Capital in 2015. At IPO, it was positioned as a dominant legacy software provider transitioning to the cloud, with strong cashflows but already facing structural competition from Xero. Bain sold the “cloud transition upside” while exiting most of its risk.

While listed, MYOB did move customers to subscription products, but growth lagged expectations and competitive pressure intensified. The share price drifted and never delivered the re-rating hoped for. KKR took MYOB private again in 2019 at $3.40. Retail investors who bought at IPO and held to the takeover probably made a modest gain or roughly broke even, but returns were pedestrian and again lagged the ASX over the same period.

3. Estia Health

Estia is an aged-care operator floated by Quadrant Private Equity in 2014. At listing, Estia owned a portfolio of care homes that had been aggressively acquired and optimised, with earnings boosted by favourable funding settings. The IPO assumed stable regulation and continued consolidation.

While listed, the operating environment deteriorated badly. Staffing costs rose, regulatory scrutiny increased, and COVID was devastating operationally and financially. Earnings collapsed and capital raisings diluted shareholders. When Bain Capital eventually took Estia private in 2023, the takeover price was well below the IPO price. A typical retail investor who held Estia from IPO to privatisation almost certainly lost a substantial amount of money.

4. SG Fleet

SG Fleet was a fleet leasing and management business, floated by Pacific Equity Partners in 2014. At IPO, it was a solid, boring, cash-generative business with government and corporate clients, modest growth and predictable margins. Unlike many others, SG Fleet continued to execute steadily while listed. Earnings grew, dividends were paid, and the business benefited from scale and contract wins.

When PEP returned to take it private again in 2024–25, the offer price was materially above the IPO. A buy-and-hold retail investor from listing through to take-private would have made a strong absolute return, comfortably positive and one of the better outcomes in this entire group.

5. Bingo Industries

Bingo was a waste management and recycling company, backed early by private capital and floated in 2017. At IPO it was sold as a growth platform rather than a mature yield stock, with exposure to construction waste, infrastructure spending and vertical integration. While listed, Bingo expanded aggressively, built infrastructure and consolidated market share.

Despite some volatility and capital intensity, earnings and strategic value increased. Macquarie ultimately acquired it in 2021 at a price far above the IPO. Retail investors who bought at IPO and held to exit made very strong returns, roughly a near-doubling of their money, making Bingo the standout success among PE-backed floats.

6. Lynch Group

Lynch was a floral wholesaler and logistics business, supplying supermarkets and florists. It was floated in 2016 by Catalyst Investment Managers as a defensive, cash-generative, niche operator. At listing, the business was already mature and heavily optimised.

While public, growth proved limited, costs rose, and margins were squeezed by supermarket bargaining power and inflation. The stock traded poorly for long stretches. When it was taken private again in 2021, the exit price was only marginally above where the shares had been trading and below the IPO. Retail investors who held from IPO to privatisation likely lost money overall.

7. Virtus Health

Virtus was a fertility services provider, floated by Quadrant Private Equity in 2013. At IPO, it was marketed as a high-quality healthcare platform with demographic tailwinds and strong cashflows, but growth assumptions were aggressive.

While listed, Virtus faced regulatory pressure on pricing, increased competition, and weaker than expected volume growth. Earnings stagnated and the share price drifted lower over time. When BGH Capital took Virtus private in 2022, the takeover price was not meaningfully above the IPO. Retail investors who bought at listing and held to exit experienced flat to negative returns.

8. Japara Healthcare

Japara was another aged-care operator, floated in 2014 after private equity ownership. Like Estia, it was listed into a favourable regulatory and funding environment, with earnings reflecting peak conditions. While listed, the sector deteriorated sharply. Cost inflation, staffing shortages and regulatory reform crushed profitability. Japara’s share price collapsed well before it was acquired in 2021. A retail investor holding from IPO through to takeover would almost certainly have lost money, even before considering opportunity cost.

9. Healthscope

Healthscope is only on this list once but completed the full yoyo twice. It was taken private by TPG and Carlyle in 2010, relisted in 2014 as a hospital operator with supposedly stable earnings, then taken private again by Brookfield in 2019.

At the 2014 IPO, Healthscope was already highly leveraged but presented as defensive infrastructure-like healthcare. While listed, earnings disappointed, debt remained high, and capital expenditure weighed on returns. The share price never delivered sustained upside. Retail investors who bought at the 2014 IPO and held until Brookfield took it private in 2019 generally made little or no return, and many lost money.

Subsequent financial distress after privatisation reinforced how much risk had been transferred to public investors during the listing phase.

Conclusion

Taken together, the pattern is pretty stark. In most cases, private equity listed businesses when operations were mature, earnings were optimised and sector conditions were favourable. Private equity got out at just the right time, and perhaps they knew what wuld happen. While listed, growth slowed, conditions worsened or competition intensified, and valuation multiples compressed.

Only in cases where there was genuine strategic expansion or consolidation, like Bingo and SG Fleet, did long-term retail investors do well. In all other cases, buy-and-hold retail investors were largely the liquidity bridge between private equity entry and exit — and often paid for it.